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Rabinovitz and Shashy: Properties of Property: Indigestion from Corn Products

PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY:
INDIGESTION FROM CORN PRODUCTS
JOEL RABINOvITZ*
ABRAHAM N. M. SHASHY, JR.**

Section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code' excludes from the definition of
capital asset "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business." 2 Sales transactions involving
property not so held and not subject to other section 1221 exclusions 3 would,
it seems, be eligible for the tax treatment attendant upon the sale of a capital
asset. 4 In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,' the Supreme Court
nonetheless held that certain sales transactions failed to qualify for capital

gain treatment even though the property was not held primarily for sale and
was therefore literally within the statutory definition of capital asset. The
Court reasoned that the Congressional intent in passing section 1221 was to
limit preferential capital gain treatment to property transactions outside the
normal course of business and that the transactions under question were not
within such intentA

Section 1231, which affords transactions in certain trade and business property the double benefit of capital treatment of gains and ordinary treatment
of losses, 7 also excludes "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." 8 In Hollywood
Baseball Association v. Commissioner,9 the Ninth Circuit held that the Corn
Products exception to section 1221 similarly applied to exclude certain property, concededly not held "primarily for sale," from the capital treatment extended by section 1231. In so holding, the court stated: "Corn Products has
*Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
O*J.D., University of Florida 1973; LL.M. (Taxation), New York University 1975; Instructor, New York University; member of the Florida Bar.
1. Unless otherwise explicitly stated, all references to the Internal Revenue Code are to
the 1954 Code.

2.

INT. REV.

CODE OF

1954, §1221(1).

3. Section 1221(2) excludes depreciable property and real property used in the trade or
business; §1221(3) excludes copyrights and various artistic and literary works in the hands
of certain categories of taxpayers; and §1221(4) excludes certain accounts and notes receivable. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1221.
4. Briefly, gains from the sale of capital assets are usually taxed at lower marginal rates
than is ordinary income. See generally INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § §1201-02, 1211-12.
5. 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. ff9746 (1955).
6. Corn Products involved the predecessor of §1221, §117(a) of the 1939 Code, but the
relevant language was identical. The Court said, "[T]he capital-asset provision of §117 must
not be so broadly applied as to defeat rather than further the purpose of Congress." Id. at
52, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. 09746, at 58,064.
7. This is, of course, an oversimplification of §1231 which requires the netting of different types of transactions in order to characterize them as ordinary or capital.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1231(b)(1)(B).
9. 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. M9251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970).
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nothing to do with 'primarily for sale.' It is a separate, nonstatutory exception
to the definition of capital assets."' 0 But almost every trade or business asset
could conceivably fall within some formulation of the Corn Products "integral
part of the business" test."' Having thus decided that section 1231 did not
establish a "fence of immunity"'12 from the Corn Products doctrine, the court
was therefore faced with the difficult problem of defining the respective territories of section 1231 and Corn Products. In so doing, it left many unanswered questions.
Hollywood Baseball also held that the Corn Products doctrine constituted
an exception to section 337, which provides for nonrecognition of corporate
gain realized on sales pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation. The court
based its conclusion on the similarity of language in sections 1221 and 337, the
inconclusive legislative history of section 337,13 and the judicial proclivity to
construe the two sections analogously.' 4 The decision has been applauded on
the same basis.' 5 Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the commentators have
analyzed the appropriate relationship between Corn Products and section 337
in terms of the function of section 337, namely the elimination of tax disparities between shareholders' sales following complete corporate liquidation
and corporate sales in anticipation of complete liquidation.16
This article first analyzes the history of section 1231, which indicates that
Congress did not intend to afford capital gains treatment to transactions involving trade or business property where sales under similar circumstances of
property literally within the statutory definition of capital asset would produce ordinary income. It next explores the scope of the Corn Products doctrine, particularly the relationship between Corn Products and section 1231.
Finally, it analyzes the purposes of section 337 and its statutory exceptions,
with a view to determining the extent to which Corn Products should be ap7
plied to section 337 liquidations.1

10. Id. at 499, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 119251, at 83,002.
11. Interestingly, the phrase "integral part of its business," the common articulation of
the Corn Products test which was accepted by the Ninth Circuit in Hollywood Baseball, was
employed by the Supreme Court in Corn Products only in describing the findings of the
lower courts. 350 U.S. at 50, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. 119746, at 56,063.
12. The Ninth Circuit thus expressly rejected the suggestion made in Deltide Fishing &
Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 666, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 119188, at 86,296
(E.D. La. 1968). Cf. Javaras, Corporate Capital Gains and Losses -The Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAxES 770, 794 (1974); Comment, 24 VAND. L. REv. 181 (1970).
13. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 1954-3 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621.
14. 423 F.2d at 499, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19251, at 83,002.
15. Note, The Applicability of the Corn Products Doctrine to Dispositions of Section
1231 Property Pursuant to a Section 337 Liquidation, 51 B.U. L. Rav. 120 (1971). But see
Comment, Taxation: Extension of Corn Products Doctrine to Section 1231 Depreciable Property and Section 337 Liquidations, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 609 (1971).
16. The problem is mentioned in Note, JudicialExceptions to Section 337: A Return to
Court Holding?, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 786, 806 (1974).
17. In Hollywood Baseball, the Ninth Circuit, after concluding that Corn Products could

apply to §1231 property, addressed itself to the §337 question before considering whether
Corn Products applied to the sales in question.
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Sections 1221 and 1231 both exclude from the category of property receiving capital gains treatment "property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Malat v. Riddell,S the courts, in determining the
character of the gain on the sale of section 1231 assets in the ordinary course
of business, generally construed the term "primarily" to include situations in
which sale was a substantial or major purpose for holding the asset. 19 With
this route foreclosed by Malat's holding that "primarily" means "of first importance" or "principally," ' 20 the lower courts, in order to reach what they regarded as the Congressionally mandated denial of capital gains treatment on
such sales, were forced to find an alternative route. Although before Hollywood Baseball, the Corn Products doctrine had not been extended to section
1231 assets, 21 it was recognized early as a possible avenue of attack. 22
The question, therefore, became whether the Corn Products doctrine,
which excludes from the definition of capital asset property which literally
complies with the statutory definition, could similarly be applied to deny
favorable tax treatment to the sale of assets literally within section 1231. The
court in Hollywood Baseball, the first post-Malat case to face the issue, decided
that the Corn Products exception could be applied to section 1231 assets. 23 At
18. 383 U.S. 569, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 19317 (1966).
19. See American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604, 1963-2 U.S.T.C. 19514 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); Recordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460, 1964-1
U.S.T.C. 19121 (Ct. Cl. 1963). But see Fishing Tools, Inc. v. Usry, 232 F. Supp. 400, 1964-1
U.S.T.C. 19456 (E.D. La. 1964); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 388 F.2d
904, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. ff9359 (Ct. CI. 1961).
20. 383 U.S. at 572, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. ff9317, at 85,671. Although Malat was construing the
term "primarily" as used in §1221(1), it has been universally regarded as applying equally to
§1231(b)(1)(B). See Hollywood Baseball, 423 F.2d at 497, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19251, at 83,000.
21. See Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 661, 666 n.3,
1968-1 U.S.T.C. 19188, at 86,295 n.3 (E.D. La. 1968).
22. Bernstein, "Prinmrily for Sale": A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (1968).
See also Note, Taxation - Corporations- Sale of Property as Part of Qualifying Liquidation
Defined Section 337 Nonrecognition Treatment: Corn Products "Integral" Test Applied "In
Light of Malat", 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 1052 (1971), suggesting that the effect of Hollywood Baseball "may be to resurrect the doctrine of 'essentially' under a new banner."
23. Ironically, Hollywood Baseball does not, in fact, appear to have been a §1231 case.
Rather than being treated as depreciable assets, the baseball player contracts involved had
been expensed by the taxpayer. The Tax Court recognized this, stating: "There may be some
question regarding petitioner's piactice of deducting in a single year the costs of the baseball
player contracts, since the relevant contracts may have had a more than I-year useful life."
42 T.C. at 262 n.6. Since, on the initial, pre-Malat hearing, the Tax Court found that the
contracts were held primarily for sale, it found it unnecessary to decide this issue. Since the
contracts had been expensed, the case might have been decided on tax benefit principles.
See Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9441 (3d Cir. 1972); Spitalny
v. United States, 430 F.2d 195, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. 9545 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v. Anders,
414 F.2d 1283, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 19573 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
Moreover, the government argued that $90,000 of the S117,000 of sales involved took place
prior to the adoption of the liquidation plan, a conclusion which appears inescapable on the
facts. The Tax Court also found it unnecessary to pass on that point. 49 T.C. at 341.
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least two subsequent cases have reached the same conclusion, relying on the
similarity of language in sections 1221 and 1231 and on an identifiable Congressional purpose to deny capital gains treatment to income arising in the
ordinary course of business.24 Neither of these cases deals satisfactorily with
the contention that section 1231 was meant to establish a "fence of immunity"
around depreciable trade or business property. The legislative history of section 1231, however, effectively disposes of any such contention 25 and, indeed,
suggests an even stronger case for the application of Corn Products as an exception to section 1231 than as an exception to the section 1221 definition of
capital asset.
When Congress first provided favored treatment for capital gains, 26 both
business land and depreciable trade or business property were included within
the capital asset definition.27 There they remained, despite several intervening
changes, 1 until 1938, when Congress removed depreciable trade or business
property from the definition. 29 In support of this change, it was argued:
Plant and equipment items used in the everyday course of operation
of a corporation's business are so obviously a part of its regular, recognized activities that taxwise they should in equity be treated no differently from the inventories of the corporation. 0
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee stated:
This important change in the law is based upon a recognition of the
principle that gains or losses realized upon the sale, exchange, or other
disposition of such property are business gains or losses, and, as such,
directly affect the volume of the business profits which should be subjected to tax in the years in which such transactions occur.3'
The House Report leaves no doubt that the Committee, as well as the
business groups supporting the change, was concerned primarily with the
problem of losses. 2 Neither the amendment nor the discussion, however, was
24. Continental Can Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19243 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970); International Shoe Machine Corp. v. United States, 369
F. Supp. 588, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 19774 (D. Mass. 1973), afJ'd, 491 F.2d 157, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19200
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
25.

Cf. Comment, 24 VAND. L. Rav. 181 (1970).

26. Revenue Act of 1921, §206.
27. Revenue Act of 1921, §206(a)(6) defined capital assets as "property acquired and held
by the taxpayer for profit or investment," excluding "stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the close of the taxable year."
28. Revenue Acts of 1929 and 1934; see the discussion of those changes in Bernstein,
supra note 22, at 1095.
29. Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 447, ch. 289, amending §117(a)(1). Land, which is not
depreciable, remained within the capital asset definition.
30.

Hearings on Revision of Revenue Laws Before the House Committee on Ways and

Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 948 (1938).
31. H.R. REP'. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 34 '(1938), 1939-1 CuM. BuLL. 752.
32. The Depression had produced large losses which, as capital losses, had since 1934
been deductible only to the extent of gains. See Revenue Act of 1934, §117(d).
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so limited. On the contrary, there was general agreement that gains or losses
on depreciable trade or business property, unlike investment or speculative
property, 33 should be taxed like other ordinary business gains or losses.
One may ask, then, how the capital gain-ordinary loss treatment now afforded by section 1231 found its way into the Code. More specifically, one
might question whether there is anything in the history of section 1231 to
suggest that Congressional policy in favor of capital treatment of gains had
become stronger with respect to trade or business property than with respect
to capital assets. If not, there is no reason to believe that section 1231 provides a "fence of immunity" from Corn Products.
The avowed purpose of section 117(j), the predecessor to section 1231, was
to allow capital gains treatment to taxpayers whose property had been destroyed or seized as a result of World War 11.34 Many shipping companies had
realized involuntary gains on the destruction of insured vessels. Other businesses had realized involuntary gains as a result of government condemnation
or requisition for military use.3 5 Since section 1033 was an inadequate solution
to the problem, 6 Congress provided capital gains treatment as a relief from
the high wartime income and excess profits tax rates, while simultaneously
preserving ordinary loss deductions for those taxpayers who had, in effect,
37
underdepreciated their business property.
As enacted, section 117(j) went far beyond this purpose. It is not surprising
that the section was extended beyond condemnations to other involuntary
conversions. Nothing in the stated purpose, however, explains the inclusion of
normal sales or exchanges of business property:
Evidently the reason for such a broad reach was that some taxpayers
were selling plant, machinery, and equipment, either under the im33. See Hearings on the 1934 Act.
34. Maurer v. United States, 284 F.2d 122, 123, 1960-2 U.S.T.C.

9809, at 78,284 (10th

Cir. 1960).

35. See B. BITTKER & J. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND Ginr TAXATION 578-80 (4th
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as BirrR & STONE]. See also Birkeland, Section 1231: A Fading
Star for the Business Taxpayer, 60 A.B.A.J. 845 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Birkeland].
36. "§1033 was applicable only if the taxpayer either replaced the property. which was
often impossible because of wartime priorities and shortages, or established a 'replacement
fund' with the proceeds of the conversion, which might have required the freezing of business capital for an unpredictable period of time." B. BITTKER & J. STONE, supra note 35, at
578.
37. The Revenue Act of 1938 had removed depreciable property, including buildings,
from the definition of capital assets. Land, however, remained within the capital asset definition. See note 29 supra. In 1942, the House provided capital gain- ordinary loss treatment
for depreciable trade or business personalty, but reinstated depreciable realty as a capital
asset "so that improvements would have the same character for tax purposes as the land
on which they stand." The Senate Finance Committee, however, included both real and

personal property in §177(j), stating:
While your committee believes it desirable for the land and the improvements to
have the same character, it considers it more appropriate to treat all property used in
the trade or business alike, and not to distinguish between land and other property

used in the trade or business. [Emphasis added.]
S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1942), 1942-2 CUM. BULL. 594.
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plicit threat of condemnation or because of other wartime conditions
(for example, merchandise shortages), and it was thought impossible to
distinguish such sales from wholly voluntary transactions. Moreover, it
was argued that sales of business property to more efficient producers
would stimulate war production. The upshot was a statute that went far
beyond its original rationale, and that persisted long after the rationale
had disappeared.3s
It is, therefore, impossible to infer from the passage of section 117(j) a very
strong Congressional policy in favor of capital gains treatment for normal
sales of trade or business property. Indeed, the pre-1942 legislative history
tends to suggest a policy of ordinary income treatment for the gains and losses
from the sale of such assets.
It might nonetheless be suggested that, regardless of the original Congressional policy in passing section 117(j), its continued presence in the
statute39 reflects a strong policy in favor of capital gains treatment of all sales
of such assets. The continued capital gain treatment under section 1231 on
sales of business property, however, is probably explained on two other
grounds. First, because the inclusion of certain timber, coal, iron ore, livestock,
and unharvested crops 40 within the definition of "property used in the trade
or business" has made section 1231 a "repository of tax 'relief' for particular
industries," 41 these special interest groups have successfully resisted any adverse change. 42 Second, the adoption in 1962 of section 1245, essentially requiring that gain on the sale of depreciable personal property be treated as
ordinary income to the extent of depredation deductions, removed any substantial incentive that the government might otherwise have had to press for
8. B. Brrr a& J. STONE, supra note 35, at 579.
39. Section 117(j) was included substantially unchanged as §1231 of the 1954 Code. The
House Report states: "This section is derived from section 117(0) of the present law. There
is no substantial change intended but some rearrangement has been made." H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1954).
40. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§1231(b)(2), (3), (4).
41. B. BITrKER & J. STONE, supra note 35, at 579.
42. "The Treasury attempted in 1950 to end the capital gain - ordinary loss aspect of
section 1231, and plumped for capital treatment throughout. This pleased a number of taxpayers, especially farmers, but drew the fire of others, especially railroads. The latter pointed
out that their abandonment losses, which were considerable, would become capital losses
whereas railroads have few capital gains. They also pointed out that abandonment is largely
the result of sudden economic obsolescence, the tax deduction for which should not differ in
quality from that for depreciation and normal obsolescence. The railroads and similarly
affected businesses prevailed and the section remained. The livestock insertion in 1952
solidified the position of the farmers, and in effect makes it impossible for the Treasury to
obtain consistency by plumping for ordinary treatment throughout." 1 S. SuRREY, W. WARREN, P.

MCDANIEL,

& H.

AULT, FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION

1031-32 n.7 (1972).

Birkeland, supra note 35, says: "Its underlying history is unique and perhaps anachronistic.
The history of the statute's evolution and the philosophy of its application provide a
fascinating tug of war between business interests seeking to retain its favorable impact and
tax reformers attempting to eliminate or diminish that result."
Recently, the House Ways and Means Committee tentatively decided to require that all
gains on the sale of depreciable personal property be taxed as ordinary income. Press Release No. 13, July 16, 1974, 6 P-H 1974 FED. TAx SER. ff59,119.13.
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across-the-board ordinary income treatment on the sale of trade or business
property. This is particularly true in light of the different Congressional attitude toward depreciable realty, as suggested below.
The legislative history of section 1231, then, leaves little room for the contention that the policy in favor of capital gains treatment on the sale of trade
or business property is stronger than that extending capital treatment to property defined as a capital asset. Since the Corn Products doctrine overrides the
favorable treatment otherwise accorded property literally within the capital
asset definition, it should be equally applicable to deny capital gains treatment to trade or business property.
1231

ASSETS AND THE SCOPE OF THE Corn ProductsDECISION

Once it has been accepted that the Corn Products doctrine may sometimes
apply to deny capital gain treatment to transactions involving section 1231
assets, the problem becomes one of determining when in fact it will override
the explicit statutory provision. The solution is evasive; there is no rational
basis for finding that the sale of some trade or business assets produces capital
gain whereas the sale of others produces ordinary income. If ordinary income
treatment is appropriate for gains from hedging transactions entered into by
a taxpayer to assure a source of components, 43 there is no reason why the gain
from the sale of machines used by a taxpayer to manufacture the needed components should receive capital gain treatment. Although Congress has mandated that the profitable sale of some business property results in capital gain,
the legislative history of section 1231 recounted above suggests that the capital
gain treatment the section affords should be sparingly granted. Thus, the Corn
Products doctrine, one tool for limiting the scope of section 1231, may be
broadly interpreted.
Problems arise, however, in only a small percentage of the sales of section
1231 assets. If a section 1231 asset is sold at a loss, as is often the case, it is
usually unimportant whether Corn Products applies to the loss, since section
1231 provides ordinary loss treatment.44 If a section 1231 asset is sold at a gain,
that gain will frequently be recaptured as ordinary income by section 1245.
Thus, the conflict between section 1231 and Corn Products arises primarily
when realty is sold or when depreciable personal property is sold for more
45
than its original cost.
43. In addition to the Corn Products case, see Rev. Rul. 58-40, 1958-1 Cumr. BULL. 275.
44. However, Coin Products' application could be crucial if in a particular year the
taxpayer's §1231 gains exceed his §1231 losses. If the application of Corn Products operates
to keep the loss out of the §1231 "hotch pot," ordinary treatment of the entire loss would
result, whereas §1231 alone would require that the loss be treated as a long term capital loss.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1231(a).
45. Section 1245(a)(2) of the Code defines recomputed basis as the adjusted basis of the
property plus all adjustments reflected in such adjusted basis on account of allowed or allowable depreciation deductions. However, if the taxpayer can establish that the amount
allowed was less than the amount allowable, only the amount allowed is considered for purposes of establishing the recomputed basis. As §1016(a)(2) states that a taxpayer's basis shall
be reduced by the allowable amount of depreciation, it is possible that the recomputed basis
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In real property cases, Corn Products should be applied sparingly, if at all.
Section 1250 reflects a Congressional judgment that real property gains that
escape recapture are generally attributable to the type of fluctuation in market
value to which Congress intended to extend capital gain treatment. 4 If there
is any validity to the distinction, such gains are more in the nature of investment gains than ordinary business profits.
The problem, therefore, exists primarily with respect to business personalty
that is sold for more than original cost. With respect to such property, there
are five categories of cases in which the Corn Products-section 1231 conflict
has arisen or is likely to arise: (1) the sale of assets held by the taxpayer for
the purpose of either sale or rental; (2) gain from customer deposits on assets
involuntarily converted while being used by the taxpayer's customers; (3) the
sale of players' contracts in the professional sports business; (4) the sale of
assets whose value has been substantially enhanced by the taxpayer's efforts;
and (5) the sale of assets whose value has been increased because of changes in
market conditions, generally attributable to some identifiable external event.
Assets Held for Sale or Rental to Customer
In these cases the taxpayer, typically a corporation engaged in the manufacture and rental of machinery to its customers, is forced by an antitrust
decree either to cease its rental business or to offer its customers the option of
purchasing machinery. Section 1231 literally applies although the gains on the
47
sales replace the rent that would have been reported as ordinary income.
Prior to Malat, the courts found ordinary income in these cases by holding
that the assets were held "primarily" for sale if sale was a substantial purpose.
With that route foreclosed by Malat's holding that "primirily" means "prind48
pally," the Internal Revenue Service had to find another avenue of attack.
In Continental Can Co. v. United States49 and International Shoe Machine
Corp. v. United States,50 the Commissioner successfully asserted the Corn
Products doctrine to achieve ordinary income results in these situations. The
Court of Claims in Continental Can relied on the Corn Products doctrine for
the proposiiion that when a taxpayer is involved in the dual business of selling
could be less than the original cost of the property. And a sale by the taxpayer at a price
between that recomputed basis and original cost would produce potential §1231 gain to
which Corn Products might apply.
46. See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1250(a)(1)(C),

(2)(B).
47. The possibility of substituting capital gain for ordinary income was particularly
great in International Shoe Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 588, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. f19774
(D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 157, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. f19200 (1st Cir. 1974), where the taxpayer
manufactured or acquired new assets only in response to a particular customer order. There
was no immediate reinvestment of the proceeds in replacement property, although property
with rental potential had been sold. The circuit court distinguished the "end of the business cycle" cases. 491 F.2d 157, 160, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19200, at 83,318 (1st Cir. 1974).
48. Bernstein, "Primarilyfor Sale": A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1968).
49. 422 F.2d 405, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19243 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
50. 369 F. Supp. 588, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9774 (D. Mass. 1973), aJ'd, 491 F.2d 157, 1974-1
U.S.T.C. 19200 (ist Cir. 1974).
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and renting a particular type of asset, the income from either activity occurs
within the normal stream of the taxpayer's business and is therefore integrally
related to that trade or business.51 Although the opinion is unclear, the court
seems to say that if property is held equally for sale and rental, both purposes
satisfy the Malat definition of "primarily" as it appears in section 1231(b)
(1)(B). 52 This failure of the court to recognize the Corn Products doctrine as a
separate nonstatutory exception to capital gain treatment, which may stem
from the Malat Court's use of Corn Products' general language to define the
54
word "primarily," 53 could cause difficulty.
In InternationalShoe the trial court, emphasizing that the recurrent sales
were accepted and predictable, held that they produced ordinary income
55
The court so held
within the "integrally related" language of Corn Products.
even though the taxpayer preferred to rent the machines, and the sales proceeds represented only a small percentage of total gross receipts.56 Attempting
to apply the Corn Products doctrine in its most pristine form, the court stated:
When applied to this case, the two pronouncements by the Court in
Malat - with respect to the word "primarily" and to the purpose of the
phrase "held by the taxpayers primarily for sale in the ordinary course
of his trade or business" - appear to lead to conflicting results. On the
one hand, generally speaking the purpose of selling its shoe machines
was not of first importance to plaintiff. But on the other, the income
from plaintiff's questioned sales arose from the everyday operation of
the business and did not represent liquidation of an investmentY7
The court went on to find ordinary income under Corn Products while recognizing that the machinery was not held primarily for sale. 58 In affirming, the
First Circuit tacitly relied on Corn Products in concluding that the income was
ordinary because the assets were sold primarily in the ordinary course of business.59
In an effort to define the limits of Corn Products, both the International
51. 422 F.2d at 410, 414-15, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19243, at 82,959-60, 83,962-63. Although not
specifically mentioning Corn Products, the court's language is indicative of its reliance on
that case.
52. 422 F.2d at 410, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19243, at 82, 959-60.
53. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 9317 (1966). "The purpose of the
statutory provision with which we deal is to differentiate between the 'profits and losses
arising from the everyday operation of a business' on the one hand (Corn Products Co. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 [1955-2 U.S.T.C. 19746]) and 'the realization of appreciation in
value accrued over a substantial period of time' on the other." Id. at 572.
54. See text accompanying notes 60-66 infra. Generally speaking, whether a court holds
that a taxpayer has ordinary income because of the Corn Products case or holds that the
taxpayer has ordinary income because of §1221(1), which applies because the gain is integrally
related via Corn Products, is irrelevant- ordinary income will result either way.
55. 369 F. Supp. 588, 593-94, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 19774, at 82,512-14 (D. Mass. 1973).
56. Id. at 590-91, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9774, at 82,510-11.
57. Id. at 592, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 19774, at 82,511-12.
58. Id. at 593, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. V19774, at 82,512-13.
59. See International Shoe Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157, 160, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
19200, at 83,318 (1st Cir. 1974).
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Shoe district court and the First Circuit decisions, as well as the Ninth Circuit
decision in Hollywood Baseball Association v. Commissioner,0 suggest that a
different treatment might result on liquidating sales,61 either on the cessation
of business or at the end of the useful life of the assets involved.62 This conclusion would seem to rest on the questionable assumption that a liquidation
sale of inventory would produce capital gain because such sales are not in the
ordinary course of business. 63 Since liquidation sales of inventory, as well as of
64
other property held primarily for sale, probably result in ordinary income,
it is important to recognize that Corn Productsis an independent exception to
capital gains treatment, separate and distinct from the statutory exception for
property held primarily for sale. Gain on property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business should be taxed as ordinary income whether the sale is in the ordinary course or not. 65 However, Corn Products seems applicable to section 1231 assets only when the sales occur in the
ordinary course of business. Therefore, liquidation sales of section 1231 assets should not be excluded from capital gain treatment by the Corn Products
doctrine. 66 The district court opinion in International Shoe is much more
compatible with this conclusion than are those of the other courts that have
considered the problem.
The Deposit Cases
When a customer forfeits a deposit placed on the taxpayer's section 1231
assets, usually either equipment leased to the customer 67 or durable containers
in which the taxpayer's liquid or gaseous products are transported to the customer, 18 the question of the character of any gain arises. 69 The forfeiture
60. 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. f19251 (9th Cir. 1970).
61. See 491 F.2d at 160, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19200, at 83,318 (1st Cir. 1974). Liquidation
sales would be an exception to the Corn Products doctrine because that doctrine focuses on
the nature of the transaction in which an asset is disposed of rather than the purpose for
which the asset was held prior to sale.
62. Estate of John F. Shea, 57 T.C. 15 (1971). The court distinguished the sale there involved from one to which Corn Products should apply by stating that the sale stemmed from
the taxpayer's decision to cease business and could "in no sense . . .be considered . . . the

normal source of business income." Id. at 26.
63. See 491 F.2d at 160, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19200, at 83,318 (1st Cir. 1974).
64. But see Grace Bros. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170, 1949-1 U.S.T.C. 19515 (9th Cir.
1949); Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 1946-1 U.S.T.C. 19120 (2d Cir. 1945). Possibly,
what the First Circuit Court of Appeals had in mind was §337(b)(2), which provides nonrecognition for certain corporate liquidation sales of §1221 and §1231 assets and similar sales
of inventory in bulk.
65. The "held primarily for sale" language of §§1221(l) and 1231 (b)(1)(B) focuses on the
nature of the asset and the purpose for which the asset is held rather than the nature of the
transaction in which it is disposed. See cases cited supra note 64.
66. Perhaps this can be justified on the theory that gain on liquidation is not a substitute for rent.
67. Fishing &Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9188
(E.D. La. 1968).
68. Philadelphia Quartz Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 512, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 19304 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 1961-1 U.S.T.C.
19359 (Ct. C. 1961); Rev. Rul. 75-34, 1975-5 INT. Ray. BuL. 14.
69. Section 1033 nonrecognition could apply if, within the statutory time period set
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usually produces a gain because the deposit amount charged to the customer
equals the original cost of the converted equipment plus a ten or fifteen percent addition either to defray the taxpayer's administrative expenses incurred
in the replacement process or to lessen the inflationary burden of replacement.
The tax treatment could differ depending upon the factor responsible for
the gain. If the ten or fifteen percent is added to defray the taxpayer's administrative expenses and those expenses are deducted by the taxpayer as
ordinary and necessary business expenses, the gain produced by the conversion
should be characterized as ordinary income under the tax benefit doctrine.70
Although the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have failed to make the
distinction, the problem is quite different if the purpose of the addition is to
combat the rising cost of replacement property.
In Revenue Ruling 58-77,71 the Service characterized forfeited deposits as

the proceeds of deferred sales, integrally related to the taxpayer's trade or
business within the meaning of the Corn Products decision. The ruling is based
on cases holding that deposits received by soft drink bottlers on bottles transferred to customers are proceeds from the sales of the bottles, which, since
breakable and relatively inexpensive, are merged with the liquids sold and
considered by the taxpayer to have been conveyed to the customer.7 2 The
courts, however, have refused to extend the application of the ruling to the
equipment or durable container cases,' 3 distinguishing them on the grounds
that the assets involved are much more durable and the taxpayer strongly
prefers having them returned.7
Judicial rejection of the merger theory refocused the issue whether the
Corn Products doctrine applies to the involuntary conversion of these section

forth, the taxpayer reinvested the proceeds in replacement property "similar or related in
service or use" and elected to have the provision apply. For the meaning of "similar or related in service or use," see TREAS. REG. §1.1033-2(c)(9) and Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 Cuas.
BULL. 319.
70. Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9441 (3d Cir. 1972); Anders
v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9573 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Rev. Rul. 72-528, 1972-2
Cu.Mt. BULL. 481; Rev. Rul. 68-104, 1968-1 Cult. BULL. 361. Section 1245 may also require gain
to be characterized as ordinary income if the forfeited deposits are made on depreciable containers.
71. 1958-1 Cui. BULL. 118.
72. See Nehi Beverage Co., 16 T.C. 1114 (1951). Some of the relevant factors were that
there was no written return-deposit agreement and that the deposits were shown as sales
proceeds on the taxpayer's books long before it was possible to determine that the bottles
were lost or destroyed and would not be returned.
73. Philadelphia Quartz Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 512, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. fT9304 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 1961-1 U.S.T.C.
19359 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
74. The taxpayer typically carried the deposits as liabilities on his books; the deposit
contracts evince the taxpayer's preference for having the assets returned. Note that in DuPont,
the taxpayer waited two or three years before transferring the deposit from the liability to
asset account, despite the fact that the contract said the customer would only have 90 days
to return the asset. The court read this as indicating rather strongly that the taxpayer preferred to have the property returned. But it could be interpreted to mean that the taxpayer
had no preference and was indeed unconcerned with the property's rteurn.
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1231 assets. The Service, in Revenue Ruling 75-34,75 accepted the view of the
courts that have answered in the negative and revoked Revenue Ruling 58-77.
Unfortunately, since Revenue Ruling 75-34 does not explain the reasoning
behind its conclusion, other than to cite PhiladelphiaQuartz v. United States 6
it provides little guidance for other transactions involving section 1231 assets.
Clearly, the Internal Revenue Service is not in accord with the reasoning
of some of the early cases, since rejected, holding that the Corn Products doctrine is inapplicable to section 1231 assets.77 In Philadelphia Quartz,78 the
Court of Claims explicitly reserved decision on that question and held that
even if Corn Productscould apply to section 1231 assets, it was inapplicable on
the facts of that case. The court, however, did not expressly explain why Corn
Products did not apply. Although it explicitly adopted the reasoning of E.L
DuPont de Nemours v. United States79 that case, too, had no satisfactory explanation. Nevertheless, the statements of facts in these cases suggest the factors
that influenced the courts' decisions: (1) the conversions were unwanted by
the taxpayers, who did all they could to prevent them; 0 and (2) the transactions were not entered into for a business purpose."'
Since the legislative history of section 1231 suggests that its primary purpose
was to extend capital gains treatment to involuntary conversions, the argument for the inapplicability of Corn Products is appealing where the taxpayer
does not wish to sell the asset in question. However, the fact that the conversions in Philadelphia Quartz and DuPont were unwanted by the taxpayer
does not distinguish those cases from International Shoe, in which the taxpayer sold the assets to the customers only as a matter of last resort. Such conversions are no more unwanted by the taxpayer in the deposit cases than the
sales in InternationalShoe, and statistically the conversions are probably just
82
as predictable and recurring.
The conclusion that the transactions were involuntary and not entered
into for a business purpose depends upon a certain temporal perspective. The
taxpayer engages in the business knowing that some conversion is bound to
occur. Such conversions would seem no less voluntary than sales of assets forced

75. 1975-5 INT. REv. BULL. 14.
76. 374 F.2d 512, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. ff9304 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
77. See Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 1968-1
U.S.T.C. 19188 (E.D. La. 1968).
78. 374 F.2d 512, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. ff9304 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
79. 288 F.2d 904, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9359 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
80. See Grant Oil Tool Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 389, 398-99, 1967-2 U.S.T.C. 19573,
at 84,857-58 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
81. Id. at 396, 1967-2 U.S.T.C. f9573, at 84,855-56. Just as the taxpayer's initiation of a

sales procedure in InternationalShoe was cited as supporting the conclusion that the sales
were accepted and predictable, so might the taxpayer's institution of a deposit procedure
support a conclusion that the conversions were accepted and predictable. See International
Shoe Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157, 160, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19200, at 83,318 (1st Cir. 1974).
82. The court in PhiladelphiaQuartz stated:
"inhere is no doubt that in the present case, the income was regular and statistically
foreseeable. We are of the view, however, that mere recurrence of income is not the test."
374 F.2d at 515, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. 19304, at 83,762.
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by an antitrust decree in InternationalShoe. Furthermore, involuntariness will
83
not transform property "held primarily for sale" into capital gain property.
There appears little reason, then, for it to preclude the application of the
Corn Products doctrine if the conversions are recurrent and predictable.
Finally, both the transfer of the property to the customer and the deposit or
replacement agreement entered into with the customer had a business purpose
- to ensure the taxpayer an adequate supply of capital with which to purchase
the section 1231 assets necessary to produce ordinary business income. Certainly the conversion had no business purpose, but it was not the conversion
alone that produced the gain. Rather, it was the specific means devised by the
taxpayer to handle the conversions that produced the taxpayer's ordinary
business income. In that sense, it is difficult to imagine how any gain might
4
be more crucial and integrally related to the taxpayer's trade or business.
Perhaps in the container cases capital gain treatment can nonetheless be
justified on the ground that the situation does not present the opportunity
for the conversion of ordinary income to capital gain. In InternationalShoe
the purchasers were the very same people who previously rented. The sales
thus diminished the taxpayer's rental market, the exploitation of which would
otherwise have produced ordinary rental income. In the container cases, on the
other hand, the retention of the containers does not affect customer need for
the taxpayer's product. The taxpayer will have the very same ordinary income
it otherwise would have had and is very likely to replace the converted containers to assure its ability to meet customer demand for the product. In this
respect, the cases are analogous to the "end of the business cycle" cases in
which Corn Products was not applied because the rental vehicles being sold
lacked any future income-producing potential. 85
Players' Contracts
The Treasury has ruled that gain from the sale of major league baseball or
football players' contracts held for more than six months will be treated as
section 1231 gain, subject, of course, to section 1245.86 In the minor leagues,
however, where a team is obligated to make its contracts available for sale
during the year, the treatment of the sales is a different matter. In Hollywood
83. Juleo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 483 F.2d 417, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. [9529 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1103 (1973).
84. Although these arrangements have been likened to insurance, Deltide Fishing &
Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 670, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 19188, at 86,298-99,
they are distinguishable in that the risk is borne by one specific entity or person, i.e., the
customer, and it is rare that a conventional insurance company will voluntarily insure anything for an amount above its appraised fair market value, much less an amount above
original cost.
85. See, e.g., Hillard v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 279, 1960-2 U.S.T.C. f19637 (5th Cir.
1960); Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129, 1956-2 U.S.T.C. 9934 (3d Cir.
1956).

86. Rev. Rul. 67-380, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 291; Rev. Rul. 71-137, 1971-1 Cum. BULL. 104.
Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 Cutc. BULL. 127, holds that bonuses paid for signing baseball players
to contracts must be amortized rather than expensed. Therefore, on sale of the contracts the
tax benefit doctrine will not be a concern.
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Baseball, Inc. v. Commissioner,8 7 the taxpayer, a minor league club in the

Pacific Coast League, had entered into certain working agreements with the
Pittsburgh Pirates. The working agreements gave the Pirates the right to
purchase a certain number of players each year from the taxpayer. The execution of the working agreement was a prerequisite to the taxpayer's admission to the league. Relying heavily on these facts, the Tax Court held, 88 and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 89 that the sales of such contracts were integral to
the taxpayer's business and thus produced ordinary gain under Corn Products.
The question now becomes whether Corn Products will be applied where
the taxpayer, although not obligated to do so, makes a substantial number of
sales of contracts throughout the year. 90 The existence of substantial and recurring sales may imply the players' contracts are being held for a dual purpose, one of which is sale, similar to the situation in International Shoe.
Despite the Hollywood court's reliance on that factor, 91 whether the sales are
required may, under InternationalShoe, have little bearing on the outcome.
Indeed, the sales in International Shoe could be viewed as required by the
forces of competition, notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer was not contractually bound to make them. It is in fact competition which compels professional sports teams to sell contracts. It would be indeed ironic if the involuntariness of the transaction, the very factor relied on to support capital
gains treatment in the deposit cases, here became the sine qua non for the application of Corn Products.Since the contract sales involved do not appear to
produce a substitute for ordinary income, as did the sales in International
Shoe, ordinary income treatment appears justifiable only by virtue of the reof the sales, a factor the Philadelphia Quartz court did not
curring incidence
92
conclusive.
find
Assets Whose Increase in Value is Attributable
to the Taxpayer's Efforts

Another common situation in which a taxpayer may be able to sell depreciable personal property at a gain not recaptured by section 1245 is that in
which property has appreciated in value because of the taxpayer's efforts. Assuming such assets are not held primarily for sale, when will their sale produce
ordinary income? Congressional action in the form of section 1221(3) has
virtually assured ordinary income treatment to the creator of certain artistic
works. But the Internal Revenue Service does not consider motion picture
87. 49 T.C. 388 (1968), afJ'd, 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. ff9251 (9th Cir. 1970).

88. 49 T.C. at 348-44.
89. 423 F.2d at 502-03, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 2f9251, at 83,005.
90. But see 49 T.C. at 343. Note the court's language, in analogizing to the hedging
transactions in Corn Products, which stresses the binding agreement to sell entered by the
taxpayer.
91. Compare the language in 49 T.C. at 343 with language in the International Shoe
decision stating that the forces of competition compelled the taxpayer to make the sales. 491
F.2d at 160, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 29200, at 83,318.
92. See note 82 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss4/4

14

Rabinovitz and Shashy: Properties of Property: Indigestion from Corn Products
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

films produced by corporations to be within section 1221(3). 93 Television films
produced by corporations are probably similarly regarded. Television and
motion picture films, even if produced by an individual, may not fall within
section 1221(3).9- These assets, which are typically produced for rental or
licensing, are like players' contracts, depreciable intangibles whose sale would
seem to produce section 1231 gain.
The Treasury, however, has ruled that the sale of television and motion
picture films created after 1948 produces ordinary income.95 The Service
reasons that, by 1948, producers realized the great sales potential of these films
or that, alternatively, since they were in the business of exploiting the films in
any way possible, the films were produced for the dual purposes of rental and
sale. The Ruling concludes that ordinary income treatment is appropriate
under Corn Products. While this approach has been criticized judicially,9G
with today's practice of renting films and then selling them to television Corn
Products is likely to be asserted vigorously by the Service. Although the sales
motive may not be primary, the gain from sales may be just as integral as the
rental income to the continued economic success of these ventures.
Assets That Have Appreciated Because of
Marked Change in Market Conditions
An asset will sometimes increase dramatically in value because of a sudden
change in market conditions. The prototype of this situation appears in
Fribourg Navigation v. Commissioner,97 where a Liberty Ship more than
doubled in value because of the shortage of ships in the period following the
closing of the Suez Canal in 1956. The Tax Court in Estate of John F. Shea,""
refused to apply the Corn Products doctrine to the sale of such an asset. Although the court emphasized that the sale was made pursuant to the taxpayer's
decision to cease business, it implied that the rapid appreciation of the asset
militated against finding that its sale resulted in gain from the "normal source
of business income" and was thus an integrally related part of the business. 99
The legislative history of section 1231 and the capital gains provisions present
a strong argument for not applying the Corn Products doctrine to section 1231
assets in this type of case.100
In summary, the courts, having decided that Corn Products can apply to
section 1231 assets, have subsequently had great difficulty in articulating when
it should apply. The difficulty is understandable since section 1231 capital gain
93.

Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 CuIN. BULL. 300.

94. See Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 132, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. f19518, at 85,174-75
(2d Cir. 1962).
95. Rev. Ru. 62-141, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 182.
96. Desilu Productions, Inc., 24 T.C. 1695 (1965).
97. 383 U.S. 272, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 9280 (1966).
98. 57 T.C. 15 (1971).
99. Id. at 24-26.
100. See text accompanying notes 26-42 supra. See Commissioner v. Bagley & Sewall, 221
F.2d 944, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 19381 (2d Cir. 1955) (taxpayer argued that a loss from the sale of
stock was an ordinary loss under the Corn Products doctrine).
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treatment has no rational basis. Despite the conceptual difficulties, the lines
are beginning to emerge. Corn Products will apply to produce ordinary income
on recurring sales in the ordinary course of business. The Internal RevenueService has admitted an exception for the involuntary conversion cases that,
although difficult to justify on doctrinal grounds, has support in the history of
section 1231. At the other extreme, Corn Products will not apply to gain on
extraordinary sales which is attributable to appreciation in market values and
presumably epitomizes the type of gain to which Congress wished to extend
capital treatment. To tax such gain as ordinary income would amount to a
repeal of section 1231.101
Corn ProductsAND SECrION 337

Having thus determined, albeit tentatively, the types of transactions to
which the Corn Products doctrine is applicable, one may question the extent
to which it should override the statutory nonrecognition otherwise mandated
by section 337. The history of section 337 is too well known to need extensive
repetition. It was passed in 1954 to eliminate the formal distinctions created
by the Supreme Court's decisions in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,102
and United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.,'03 and to minimize the
federal income tax as a factor in choosing the form in which to effect a corporate sale.10 4 When, however, the court was required in Hollywood Baseball
to decide whether the Corn Products doctrine was an exception to the nonrecognition provisions of section 337, it ignored this history0 5 and based its
101. The House Ways and Means Committee decision of April 30, 1973, suggested that
depreciable personal property subject to §1245 be eliminated from §1231 entirely. This proposal is being given serious consideration by the Committee again currently.
102. 324 U.S. 331, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 19215 (1945).
103. 338 U.S. 451, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 119129 (1950).
104. The Senate Report described the problem:
"Section 337 ... concerns the problems raised by the decisions in Commissioner v. Court
Holding Company . ..

and U.S. v. Cumberland Public Service Co ....

and the numerous

related cases. These decisions involved the question of whether the corporation or the shareholder effected a sale of property in connection with the liquidation of the corporation.
Under the decision in Cumberland Public Service Co ...
it is indicated that in the case
of a distribution of property in liquidation of a corporation followed by its sale made in
fact by its shareholders, a single tax is imposed at the shareholder level. Where the shareholders in fact did not effect the sale, tax is imposed both at the corporate and at the shareholder level. Accordingly, under present law the tax consequences arising from sales made in
the course of liquidation may depend primarily upon the formal manner in which transactions are arranged. Your committee intends in section 337 to provide a definitive rule which
will eliminate the present uncertainties." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 3 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nvs 4896.
105. The court found the legislative history "notably unhelpful," 423 F.2d at 499, 1970-1
U.S.T.C. ff9251, at 83,002, and rejected the Commissioner's argument that the Senate Report
stated that §337 was inapplicable to sales in the ordinary course of business by pointing out
that "this sentence appears in a section discussing the bulk sales exception relating to inventory." Id. at 500, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 119251 at 83,003.
The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that the House version of §337, H.R. 8300, §333,
which would have explicitly denied nonrecognition to sales in the ordinary course of business, was not enacted.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss4/4

16

Rabinovitz and Shashy: Properties of Property: Indigestion from Corn Products
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

conclusion instead on the similarity of language in sections 337 and 1231,10r
the judicial tendency to construe them consistently,107 and the old saw that
section 337 should be strictly construed. 08
The interpretation of section 337 by reference to section 1221 has rightfully received widespread acceptance, since it appears likely that Congress intended to except transactions in the ordinary course of business from the
favorable treatment afforded by each section. 109 In view of the apparent rebirth of the very discrepancies which Congress, in adopting section 337,
1
thought it was eliminating,"0
it seems particularly apposite to analyze the
scope of an exception to section 337 in terms of its consistency with the congressional purpose to eliminate formal distinctions."' As judicial exceptions
106. In speculating on the reasons for the Senate change from the House version, the
court said:
"Perhaps the changes in terminology were made in order to make the language of §337
more nearly approximate the language of §§1221 and 1231." 423 F.2d at 500, 1970-1 U.S.T.C.
19251, at 83,003.
The court had, however, previously pointed out the differences in language between
§§1221 and 1231 on the one hand and §337 on the other. Id. at 499, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19251,
at 83,003.
107. Id. at 499, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19251, at 83,002.
108. Id. at 500, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. g9251, at 83,003.
109. For a discussion of the legislative history of §1221, see Bernstein, supra note 22, at
1095. Regarding §337, see the court's discussion in Hollywood Baseball, 423 F.2d at 499,
1970-1 U.S.T.C. 9251, at 83,002.
110. Note, Judicial Exceptions Under Section 337: A Return to Court Holding?, 26 U.
FLA. L. REV. 786 (1974), and cases discussed therein.
Ill. See Midland Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. f9678 (6th
Cir. 1973), and Frank XV. Verito, 43 T.C. 429, 440 (1965), acquiesced in 1965-2 Cut. BULL. 7,
in which the Tax Court said:
"[T]he purpose of section 337 was to do away with the necessity of deciding who made
the sale as long as the corporation is in a state of complete liquidation and the sale (of
property) takes place within a certain period of time. Any result which would cause the
question of taxation to once again depend upon who made the sale, where the formal requirements of the section have been met, would be a direct violation of the section."
The Internal Revenue Service has recently reiterated the desirability of consistency in this
area in announcing that it would not follow Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, 324 F.2d
837, 1964-1 U.S.T.C. 19678 (9th Cir. 1963), a case refusing to apply the tax benefit rule to
require recognition of gain by a corporation liquidating under §336:
"In Anders v. Commissioner, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969), the court, following Rev. Rul.
61-214, 1961-2 CuN. BULL. 60, held that the tax-benefit rule applied when a corporation sold
expensed linen supplies pursuant to the nonrecognition of gain provision of section 337 of
the Code. The purpose of enacting section 337 was to make tax considerations a neutral
factor in the determination of whether a liquidating corporation would itself sell its assets
and distribute the proceeds, or, alternatively, distribute the assets to its shareholders for sale
at that level. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1954). Applying the tax benefit
rule to liquidations to which section 336 applies insures that tax considerations will remain
a neutral factor in this determination." Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974 INT. REV.BULL. No. 33, at 10.
The argument for parallel interpretation of §336 and §337 has received recent support
from the Supreme Court's decision in Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 94 S. Ct.
2516, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. ff9511 (1974). The majority supported its rejection of the taxpayer's
claim that §337 protected the gain from the recovery of insurance proceeds from a fire occurring prior to the adoption of a liquidation plan by pointing out that its result did not
subvert the purpose of §337: "The taxpayer's analogy to the ordinary sale transaction has
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are engrafted on section 337 that are not also exceptions to section 336, there
will be a growing federal income tax impetus toward forsaking section 337 and
either selling stock"12 or, if that is unacceptable to the buyer, liquidating in
anticipation of a shareholder asset sale. 31 s Although a finding of exceptions to
section 337 is not necessarily precluded by the absence of analogous exceptions
to section 336, the possibility of such a discrepancy should at least temper the
otherwise irresistible submission to literal parallelism.
Even property held primarily for sale can be distributed in liquidation
without recognition of gain to the distributing corporation."- 4 It is reasonably
clear, therefore, that there is no Corn Products exception to section 336.",5
Before considering whether a Corn Products exception to section 337 would
create an undesirable dichotomy between corporate sales preceding liquidation and functionally equivalent alternatives, section 337 treatment of inventory should be examined."16 Since, as noted above, the Corn Products doctrine
is most frequently applied when property, although not held primarily for
7
sale within the meaning of Malat, is sold in the ordinary course of business,"1
the Corn Productsrationale is closely akin to that employed in denying section
337 nonrecognition to gain from routine inventory sales. If Congress, in adopting section 337, provided for differences in the tax treatment of the sale of inventory depending on whether the sale preceded or followed the liquidation,
judicial acceptance of a similar dichotomy for Corn Products-type property is
more supportable.
some superficial appeal. It fails, however, to give sufficient consideration to the underlying
purpose of §337(a)," Id. at 84,554. The Court then continued: "When the casualty occurs
prior to the corporation's committing itself to liquidation, no Court Holding- Cumberland
problem is presented." Id.
112. Presumably the buyer would then liquidate the purchased corporation to obtain a
basis step-up under §334(b)(2), and the tax consequences to the liquidating corporation would
be determined by §336.
113. Whether the stockholder at the time of liquidation is the seller or the buyer, there
are certain inevitable tax costs, e.g., §1245 and §453(d), which will presumably be reflected
in a lower price for stock than for assets. If, however, a §336 liquidation altogether avoids
tax costs attendant upon a §337 sale, the size of the pie is enlarged, and the seller might be
able to offer the buyer a sufficient inducement to buy stock.
114. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §336. Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §311(b). For a discussion of possible tax to the distributing corporation in such cases, see text accompanying
notes 121-126 infra. A discussion of the questionable wisdom of §336 is beyond the scope of
this article.
115. See B. BrrrKE & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAaREoLDnas 11-71 n.131 (2d ed. 1966). The Internal Revenue Service does not seem to have
asserted such an exception. Given the result in Hollywood Baseball, however, and the recently repeated assertion that §§336 and 337 are to be construed in parallel, supra note 105,
perhaps we should not be too surprised if such an assertion is forthcoming.
116. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§337(b)(1)(A), (2)(A).
117. Applying a Corn Products exception to §337 to other types of transactions in which
it might constitute an exception to §1221 or §1231 comes very dose to saying that §337 applies only to capital assets. Although this view was expressed in Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 34, 45, 1965-1 U.S.T.C. 988, at 95,404 (4th Cir. 1965), it has generally been
rejected. See Midland Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. f[9678 (6th
Cir. 1973); Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. ff9251
(9th Cir. 1970)...
...
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Section 337 generally excepts inventory and property held "primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of . . .trade or business" from nonrecognition. 118 Such property is, however, entitled to nonrecognition "if substantially all [such] property .. .which is attributable to a trade or business
•.. is ...sold or exchanged to one person in one transaction." 119 The purpose
of this pattern was explained by the Senate Finance Committee:
It is intended that, during the 12-month period, sales in the ordinary
course of business shall result in ordinary gain to the corporation as if
the corporation were not in the process of liquidating. Your committee
intends that where a bulk sale of the inventory assets is made at the
beginning of the 12-month period, that [sic] no replacement of inventory
or the acquisition of a new kind of inventory to conduct ordinary business for the balance of the 12-month period will be allowed. Thus, the
ordinarily be the last sale made by the corporabulk sale referred to 2will
0
tion of its inventory.

This statutory pattern, however, at least on its face, falls short of producing
the desired tax neutrality between corporate sales and shareholder sales following liquidation. Since the courts, absent a showing of corporate negotiation
or participation in the sale, have generally refused to impute to the corpora1
it is theoretically possible for
tion shareholder sales following a liquidation, "
118. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §337(b)(1)(A).
119. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §337(b)(2)(A).
120. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 1954-3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4897.
121. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 338 U.S. 451, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 9129
(1950). In Hines v. United States, 477 F.2d 1063, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. r9403 (5th Cir. 1973), the
corporation was effectively prevented from liquidating by a will provision. The court none
theless rejected the Government's contention: "[T]he proceeds from the sale of property
distributed by a going concern in anticipation of a sale by the shareholders and with no
valid business purpose other than tax avoidance are properly imputed to the distributing
corporation." 477 F.2d at 1067, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9403, at 80,944.
Distinguishing the cases relied upon by the Government, the court sa)s:
"A reading of Court Holding and Cumberland establishes that the proceeds of the sale of
property distributed by a corporation to its shareholders should be imputed to the corporation only if the sale was in fact made by the corporation, not by the shareholders. In the
instant case the District Court imputed to Peeler Realty the proceeds of a sale by its shareholders without finding that Peeler Realty had in fact made the sale. Moreover, the District
Court found that Peeler Realty had neither negotiated the sale prior to distribution nor
participated in the sale after distribution. The government argues that imputation was nonetheless proper because subsequent case law indicates that the imputed income rule must
apply even where there are no pre-distribution sales negotiations, if the transfer was made
(1) by an ongoing concern (2) in anticipation of a sale by the shareholders, and (3) with no
valid business purpose aside from motives of tax avoidance. We cannot agree.
"Our reading of the applicable case law in this area convinces us that the District Court
erred. We hold that the sine qua non of the imputed income rule is a finding that the corporation actively participated in the transaction that produced the income to be imputed.
Only if the corporation in fact participated in the sale transaction, by negotiation, prior
agreement, postdistribution activities, or participated in any other significant manner, could
the corporation be charged with earning the income sought to be taxed. Any other result
would unfairly charge the corporation with tax liability for a transaction in which it had no
involvement or control." 477 F.2d at 1069-70, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9403, at 80,946.
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the corporation to avoid tax on routine sales by first distributing the assets to
the shareholders. 122 Although careful orchestration may indeed preserve nonrecognition at the corporate level, 23 it is more likely, particularly with regard
to inventory, that courts will find some corporate negotiation or participation
on which to base an imputation of the sale to the corporation. 124 Despite some
theoretical gap, then, in the planned parity between corporate sales of inventory under section 337 and postliquidation shareholder sales, the statutory
scheme does not appear to undermine seriously the Congressional purpose of
equalization. So, too, since sales in the ordinary course of business run a high
risk of being imputed to the corporation, no serious subversion would seem to
occur if Corn Products were applied as an exception to section 337. Indeed,
since section 337 is designed to deny nonrecognition to sales in the ordinary
course of business, 25 Corn Products should constitute an exception.
The preceding discussion, of course, is based on the assumption that the
sales in question are sales in the ordinary course of business, rather than bulk
sales. Bulk sales of Corn Products-type property should no more give rise to
recognition under section 337 than do bulk sales of inventory. To the extent
that Corn Products applies only to sales in the ordinary course of business,
rather than to any sale of an asset generally sold in the ordinary course, it is
inapplicable to override section 337 with respect to bulk sales. To the extent,

In a case involving the same corporation, the Tax Court also rejected the Government's
contention that the assignment of income doctrine applied. Peeler Realty, 60 T.C. 705 (1973).
122. Any appreciation would, of course, be reflected as additional capital gain realized
by the shareholders on the liquidation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §331. Additional gain, reflecting postdistribution appreciation or profit attributable to selling effort, may be realized
by the shareholders on sale of the assets, perhaps even as capital gain. See Greenspan v.
Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. f19249 (8th Cir. 1956). Cf. Baker v. United States,
248 F.2d 893, 1957-2 U.S.T.C. 110,008 (5th Cir. 1957).
123. Although the shareholders would generally be reluctant to liquidate without some
prior assurance of sale, presumably the concern here is not with the bulk sale to the purchaser of the business but rather with routine sales to others. The sale of the business may
have been negotiated previously without tainting the routine sales under Court Holding.
It may be of some significance that the gain in Hines was gain that would have been
insulated by §837 had the corporation not been prevented by a provision of its founder's
will from liquidating.
124. B. Brrrxa & J. Eusnc, supra note 115, states:
"If a corporation holding appreciated inventory property does not wish to sell it in bulk,
it may be possible to avoid a double tax even though §337(a) does not apply. The property
in question might be distributed in liquidation to the shareholders, and sold by them as
partners in reliance on the Cumberland Public Service Co. case. There is some reason to believe, however, that the Court Holding Co. doctrine would be applied even more freely to
so-called shareholder sales of inventory than to their sales of other types of property, at least
if the corporation's business is in effect carried on by the shareholders at the same place, in
the same way, and with the customers. ... Sales of the distributed inventory in the ordinary
course of business, even though made in form by the shareholders, might therefore be regarded as a belated realization of corporate profits." Id. at 11-65, 11-66.
The only authority cited, however, is United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718, 1951-2 U.S.T.C.
19507 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S 934 (1952), which was not a complete liquidation
case.
125. Cf. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n, 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19251 (9th Cir. 1970).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss4/4

20

Rabinovitz and Shashy: Properties of Property: Indigestion from Corn Products
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

however, that Corn Products is not so limited, a bulk sales exception similar
to the one for inventory should be read into the statute. 12- 6
CONCLUSION

The Corn Products doctrine has, since its inception, been relied upon by
the Service to pursue ordinary gain in many factual settings, involving several
sections of the Code. This article has by no means been an attempt to canvass
all of these. Rather, it has primarily focused on the application of the doctrine
vis Avis sections 1231 and 337.
'With respect to section 1231, it has been concluded that there is no legislative reason for immunizing that section from an extrastatutory exception that
applies to section 1221. The Corn Products doctrine, then, should be potentially applicable to the gain from the sale or exchange of section 1231 assets.
However, the extent to which the doctrine will apply to pre-empt section 1231
is not a question that is easy to resolve. Although Corn Products, extended to
an extreme, could be argued to effectively eliminate section 1231 from the
Code, the decisions to date evince rejection of such a far-reaching interpretation of the case. Moreover, these decisions provide some guidelines as to when
the Corn Products doctrine will be asserted, despite the fact that some apparent analytical inconsistencies seem to exist between the dual purpose and
the deposit cases. The different results in these two areas can be reconciled by
the fact that the deposit cases do not involve the substitution of capital gain
for what would otherwise be ordinary income. Finally, if multiplicity of
transactions enhances the application of Corn Products, gain from sales of
players' contracts by professional sports teams and gain from the sale of movies
by corporate or individual producers seem particularly ripe.
Turning to section 337, it appears that while the courts applying Corn
Products as an exception to section 337 in nonbulk sales situations have not
bothered to inquire, such application does no harm to the legislative intent
that Congress had in enacting section 337. The existence of this Corn Products
exception to section 337 may, at first blush, strike one as inconsistent with the
fact that no such exception exists to section 336. However, the likelihood that
the Court Holding rationale would be liberally applied to impute gain to the
corporation on a subsequent shareholder sale of the liquidated corporation's
former assets confirms the propriety of Corn Products as an exception to section 337.
With respect to both section 337 and section 1231, Corn Products should
only apply to gain derived from assets disposed of in the ordinary or normal
course of business, i.e., dispositions other than bulk liquidation sales of the
assets.
126. Since the Corn Products doctrine does not render an asset "held primarily for sale"
but is rather a separate, nonstatutory exception (see text accompanying notes 53-54 supra),
the bulk sale exception in §337 (b)(2)(A) is literally inapplicable.
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